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contrast, several studies have shown that expressive suppression 
impairs explicit memory (Richards and Gross, 1999, 2000, 2006; 
Richards et al., 2003; Bonanno et al., 2004; Dillon et al., 2007). 
During suppression, individuals refrain from displaying emotional 
expressions so that an outside observer would be unable to discern 
their internal emotional state. In addition to being associated with 
diminished memory performance, suppression is generally inferior 
to reappraisal in reducing negative affect after viewing negative 
film clips (Goldin et al., 2008) and negative pictures (Richards 
and Gross, 2000), and prior to broaching a relationship conflict 
with a romantic partner (Richards et al., 2003). Taken together, the 
available evidence suggests that engaging in cognitive reappraisal 
may actually be beneficial for memory even in the throes of emo-
tional distress, whereas suppression may lead to the formation of 
incomplete representations of the negative event.
The observation that cognitive reappraisal is associated with 
enhanced memory and reduced arousal presents a dilemma for 
neurobiological  theories  of  emotional  memory.  The  memory 
modulation hypothesis (McGaugh, 2004) states that the amygdala 
is critical for modulating hippocampal-dependent consolidation 
processes as a function of arousal, a finding that has received 
substantial support across species and neuroscientific methods 
IntroductIon
When faced with a distressing situation, individuals often attempt 
to assess and then regulate their resulting negative emotions. By 
doing so, individuals not only change their emotional reaction 
to the negative event, but also alter how the event is encoded in 
memory. The processes involved in negative memory encoding and 
retrieval are thought to play a major role in the development and 
maintenance of certain psychiatric disorders, such as depression 
and posttraumatic stress disorder (Watkins et al., 1992; Brewin, 
2001; Hamilton and Gotlib, 2008). Consequently, investigating how 
regulatory strategies alter information encoding has the potential 
to inform our understanding of the etiology and clinical treatment 
of these disorders.
Recent behavioral studies have shown that regulation tech-
niques  have  differential  consequences  for  long-term  memory. 
For instance, engaging in cognitive reappraisal enhances explicit 
memory performance (Richards and Gross, 2000; Richards et al., 
2003; Dillon et al., 2007). By employing cognitive reappraisal, 
one can either decrease or increase the negative associations of a 
stimulus by changing its meaning or self-relevance. As an example, 
negative affect for a picture of a horrific car crash may be reduced 
by imagining that the passengers were not seriously injured. By 
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(Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). However, 
human   experience of emotion is unequivocally complex. Individuals 
typically do not simply watch negative experiences unfold without 
attempting to manage their negative emotions. Studies have shown 
that when employing cognitive reappraisal to decrease negative 
affect, amygdala activity and self-reported affect are reduced relative 
to passive viewing conditions (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner, 2004; 
Dillon et al., 2007). Therefore, it is currently unknown how neural 
activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and other regions could 
predict encoding success despite a reduction in negative arousal.
We have previously proposed that the memory retention advan-
tage during cognitive reappraisal is related to deep stimulus elabo-
ration (Dillon et al., 2007). In our view, reappraisal encourages 
meaningful analysis of the negative stimulus, promoting deep and 
elaborative semantic encoding. We further suggest that during sup-
pression, the focus on inhibition of emotional expression directs 
attention  away  from  stimulus  elaboration,  resulting  in  poorer 
memory performance. The idea that memory encoding is enhanced 
for items that are meaningful is known as the levels-of-processing 
effect (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). Although previous neuroimag-
ing studies of cognitive reappraisal have not explicitly investigated 
memory effects, results have consistently shown recruitment of 
a network of prefrontal regions thought to subserve elaborative 
memory, including the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) and medial 
prefrontal cortex (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). The LIFG might be a 
likely candidate to support the memory enhancement effect during 
reappraisal because it is reliably activated during deep encoding 
of subsequently remembered stimuli (Otten et al., 2001; Fletcher 
et al., 2003) and is involved in the cognitive control of memory, 
including lexical–semantic processing (Gabrieli et al. 1998) and 
working memory (D’Esposito et al., 1999).
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the neu-
ral  correlates  of  memory  encoding  under  different  regulation 
strategies. To elucidate the role of the prefrontal cortex and MTL 
regions in successful memory encoding during emotion regula-
tion attempts, we compared co-activation patterns of the LIFG, 
amygdala, and hippocampus in an experimental design that com-
bined emotion regulation instructions with a subsequent memory 
paradigm (Paller and Wagner, 2002). Participants underwent event-
related fMRI while viewing negative scenes and engaging in one 
of three regulation strategies: “view,” “reappraise,” or “suppress” 
(Figure 1). At the end of each trial, participants made a valence 
and confidence judgment regarding their success in engaging in 
each strategy. Participants returned two weeks later for a surprise 
recognition memory test. Study items were partitioned into events 
that were later remembered or forgotten. Greater brain activity 
for subsequently remembered than forgotten items is known as 
the difference due to memory effect (Dm effect) and is thought to 
reflect successful encoding processes (Paller and Wagner, 2002). In 
support of the levels-of-processing hypothesis, we predicted that 
subsequent memory during reappraisal would be associated with 
greater LIFG–hippocampal coupling relative to the other condi-
tions. To test this hypothesis, we performed a correlation analy-
sis that examined memory success-related co-activation of these 
regions  for  each  condition  (cognitive  reappraisal,  suppression, 
negative view). Previously, we used this approach to show that the 
memory advantage for emotional information over neutral infor-
mation is subserved by greater amygdala–MTL correlations for 
emotional Dm (Dolcos et al., 2004). Therefore, we predicted that the 
LIFG and hippocampus should be more positively correlated when 
individuals engaged in cognitive reappraisal than during suppres-
sion or negative viewing that reflects a deeper level of encoding.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Twenty-five participants (11 female) between the ages of 18 and 
27 (average age ± SD: 21.6 ± 2.5; 15 Caucasian, 5 Asian, 3 Black, 2 
Other/Multiracial, 23 right-handed, 2 left-handed) were recruited 
from a research recruitment database of college and community 
participants. All participants provided written informed consent 
for procedures approved by the Institutional Review Board of Duke 
University Medical Center.
MaterIals
Stimuli consisted of 120 high-arousing negatively valenced and 40 
neutral pictures selected from the International Affective Picture 
Set (IAPS; Lang et al., 1997) and supplemented with in-house pic-
tures that had normative data from a separate group of healthy 
individuals. The negative pictures were partitioned into 40 each 
for the negative view, reappraise, and suppress conditions while 
Figure 1 | Study protocol. Subjects viewed pictures for 2 s, after which the 
regulation instruction was superimposed on the picture with 50% transparency 
for 2 s. Participants viewed the regulation strategy only for an additional 6 s. They 
were instructed to make a valence and confidence judgment regarding their 
success in implementing the strategy correctly. The symbols used were an eye 
for “view, ” a refresh sign for “reappraise, ” and an X for “suppress. ”Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  3
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MagnetIc resonance IMagIng acquIsItIon
Functional images were acquired on a 4-T GE scanner with an 
inverse  spiral  pulse  sequence  to  reduce  susceptibility  artifact 
(Guo and Song, 2003). A series of 34 interleaved axial functional 
slices were acquired for full-brain coverage with the following 
parameters: TR = 2000 ms; TE = 31 ms; FOV = 240 mm2; matrix 
size = 642; slice thickness = 3.75 mm × 3.75 mm × 3.8 mm vox-
els.  High-resolution  three-dimensional  spin-echo  co-planar 
structural images were acquired in 68 axial slices (TR = 12 ms; 
TE = 5.4 ms; FOV = 240 mm2; matrix size = 2562; slice thick-
ness = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1.9 mm voxels).
fMrI data analysIs
Functional  data  sets  were  analyzed  using  FSL  version  4.1.0. 
Preprocessing was applied to individual subjects’ data in the fol-
lowing steps: (i) brain extraction for non-brain removal (Smith, 
2002), (ii) motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 
2002), (iii) spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 
5 mm, and (iv) high-pass filtering (Jenkinson et al., 2002; Smith 
et al., 2004). Functional images of each subject were co-registered 
to structural images in native space, and structural images were 
normalized to MNI space. The same transformation matrices were 
then used for functional-to-standard space transformations. Pre-
whitening was estimated and corrected using FMRIB’s Improved 
Linear Model (FILM; Woolrich et al., 2001). Onset times of events, 
which corresponded to the onset of each regulation instruction, 
were used to model a signal response containing a regressor for 
each condition (i.e., hits and misses for each condition of neutral, 
view, reappraise, and suppress) and convolved with a gamma func-
tion. Parameter estimates from individual fMRI runs were fed into 
a second-level statistical analysis. Average maps representative of 
the general population were calculated in a mixed effects higher 
level analysis using Bayesian estimation techniques, FMRIB Local 
Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME; Beckmann et al., 2003; Woolrich 
et al., 2004) with cluster mean threshold of Z > 2.3 and a cluster-
corrected significance threshold of P < 0.05 to protect against false 
positive detection of activation clusters (Worsley, 2001). Due to our 
a priori interest in amygdala activity, we applied an amygdala mask 
to extract parameter estimates from each individual in normalized 
space. Monte Carlo permutation (5000 permutations) provided 
a distribution for an (near) exact test statistic to compute a sig-
nificance threshold of P = 0.05. Thus no assumptions are made 
about the distribution (e.g., Guassianity) under the null hypothesis. 
The outcome of this test statistic was subjected to threshold free 
cluster enhancement to control the family wise error (Smith and 
Nichols, 2009).
To identify co-activation between regions-of-interest (ROIs), 
functional ROIs were defined from the main effect of memory in 
the omnibus ANOVA which compared hits to misses across all trials 
presented in the experiment. Note that this criterion is statistically 
independent of the emotion regulation × memory × ROI interac-
tions used in the connectivity analyses. Hits were defined as items 
that were subsequently remembered with high confidence (rating of 
3 or 4 on a 4-point confidence scale). Only high confidence hits were 
used because previous work in our laboratory suggests that memory 
for low confidence items is as chance, and therefore, may not reflect 
true successful memory. All misses were included in the analysis, 
the 40 neutral pictures were selected for the neutral condition. 
Negative pictures across the three conditions (view, reappraise, 
suppress) were equated for valence [F(2,78) = 0.31, P > 0.73] and 
arousal [F(2,78) = 0.610, P > 0.54]. Negative pictures were more 
negatively valenced and higher in arousal than neutral pictures 
(based on ratings on a 1–9 point scale). The average (±SD) valence 
ratings were: neutral = 5.08 ± 0.36; view = 2.5 ± 0.65; reappraise 
2.5 ± 0.67; suppress = 2.6 ± 0.64. Average arousal ratings were: 
neutral = 3.6 ± 0.52; view = 5.88 ± 0.81; reappraise = 5.93 ± 0.80; 
suppress = 5.81 ± 0.70. Pictures were also equated for social content 
(i.e., presence of human faces) and the amount of red color, as dif-
ferences in pictures in these dimensions may influence emotional 
experience and therefore neural signal (Kaya and Epps, 2004; Hill 
and Barton, 2005; Elliot and Maier, 2007).
Procedure
Prior to engaging in the fMRI task, participants were trained in 
each regulation strategy. For the view and neutral trials, participants 
were instructed to “simply look at the picture and let any emotions 
you’re feeling unfold naturally.” For suppress trials, participants 
were instructed to “not let any emotion you are feeling show on 
your face.” For reappraise trials, participants were instructed to 
“place yourself as an observer in the scene, but change the way you 
think about it by making it not relevant to you or your loved ones.” 
These instructions, which were previously used in our laboratory 
(Dillon et al., 2007), were explained in greater detail, and several 
examples were provided. When participants reported understand-
ing the difference between the strategies, they performed a prac-
tice task in which they viewed negative and neutral pictures on a 
desktop computer and rehearsed each strategy while articulating its 
implementation aloud. The experimenter answered questions and 
corrected participants if necessary. Participants then practiced the 
task as they would in the fMRI environment, without verbalizing 
their strategy and while making valence and confidence ratings.
The stimulus set of 160 pictures was divided into 10 encoding 
runs. To avoid the induction of long-lasting mood states, the pictures 
within each run were pseudo-randomized so that no more than 
three negative pictures were consecutively presented. Instruction 
cues were randomized. Each trial began with a 2-s presentation of 
a picture, which was followed by an instruction symbol overlaid on 
the picture with 50% transparency for 2 s (see Figure 1). The picture 
then disappeared while the instruction symbol remained for an 
additional 6 s. This overlapping sequence was used to unconfound 
instructional cue interpretation from the regulation period. Subjects 
made a valence rating on a four-point rating scale (1 = unhappy, 
4 = happy), indicating their own emotional response to the picture, 
and a confidence rating regarding how well they were able to engage 
in the strategy (1 = not confident, 4 = very confident). Participants 
had 2 s to make each of these judgments. A fixation cross (jittered 
5–7 s) followed for a total trial length of 19–21 s.
Participants returned 2 weeks after the encoding session for a 
surprise memory test (incidental encoding). Participants viewed 
the original 160 pictures along with 100 novel foils (60 negative, 40 
neutral). The pictures were presented in black and white to increase 
task difficulty (as based on our previous pilot data). Participants 
made an “old” or “new” judgment and a confidence rating on a 
4-point scale.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  4
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To examine whether participants showed a reduction in nega-
tive valence as a function of successful use of each strategy, we 
compared valence ratings for unsuccessful attempts in executing 
the strategy (combined across confidence ratings 1 and 2) to suc-
cessful attempts (combined across confidence ratings 3 and 4). 
Valence significantly improved when participants were successful 
in reappraising a picture [t(23) = 2.35, P < 0.03] but not after suc-
cessfully engaging in suppression [t(23) = 1.53, P > 0.13] or after 
successfully viewing negative pictures [t(21) = 0.73, P > 0.47]. These 
results support prior research indicating that cognitive reappraisal 
is a more effective emotion regulation strategy than expressive sup-
pression (Richards and Gross, 2000; Goldin et al., 2008).
Neural systems underlying negative emotion and its regulation
Whole brain voxel analyses showed that viewing negative pictures 
without engaging in a regulation strategy (versus neutral pictures) 
activated  several  regions  including  bilateral  amygdala,  insular 
cortex, subcallosal cortex, and bilateral posterior cingulate cortex 
(Table 1). The contrast of view > reappraise revealed activity in 
bilateral insula and amygdala (Figure 3A; Table 1). The contrast of 
view > suppress also revealed bilateral activation in the amygdala 
(Figure 3B; Table 1). Taken together, these results suggest that view-
ing negative pictures activated a network of regions implicated in 
emotion, and that engaging in emotion regulation was effective in 
reducing amygdala activity.
We next compared regions involved in cognitive reappraisal and 
suppression. In comparison to the view condition, reappraisal acti-
vated a network of prefrontal cortex activity including bilateral infe-
rior prefrontal cortex and paracingulate gyrus (Figure 3C; Table 2). 
across confidence ratings. Across the negative   conditions, there were 
on average 17 hit trials (SD = 1) and 14 miss trials (SD = 1). For 
the neutral condition, there were on average 14 hit trials (SD = 14) 
and 17 miss trials (SD = 17). Given our strong a priori interest in 
examining specific PFC and MTL regions related to our hypotheses, 
ROIs were identified that survived a voxelwise threshold of P < 0.01 
and a cluster extent threshold corrected for multiple comparisons 
to P < 0.05 identified by Monte Carlo simulations (Slotnick and 
Schacter, 2004). This procedure relies on the notion that the prob-
ability of observing clusters of activity due to noise decreases with 
increasing cluster size. The simulation consisted of 1000 independ-
ent iterations where brain volume was modeled using a 64 × 64 × 34 
matrix and assuming a type 1 error voxel activation probability of 
0.01. The simulations resulted in a cluster extent threshold of 14 
resampled voxels (112 mm3). The prefrontal and MTL regions sur-
viving this threshold were selected for the ROI analyses and included 
the amygdala, hippocampus, an anterior, and posterior region of 
the left IFG, superior frontal gyrus, frontal pole, and medial cortex. 
Regions were not spatially overlapping or contiguous. Percent signal 
change was extracted from each ROI using custom scripts. For each 
individual, fMRI signal was averaged as a function of condition 
type (i.e., reappraise hits, reappraise misses, suppress hits, suppress 
misses, view hits, and view misses) and 1 pre-stimulus and 10 post-
stimulus time points. Percent signal change at peak time points 
8–10 s were averaged for hits and misses separately for each ROI and 
experimental condition, and subtracted to obtain the Dm estimate. 
Correlation analyses utilized the Dm estimate for each condition in 
ROIs. For example, to calculate the correlation between memory 
success activity in the amygdala and hippocampus during cognitive 
reappraisal, we extracted percent signal change for reappraise hits 
and reappraise misses in the amygdala and hippocampus separately 
for each individual subject. Percent signal change for reappraise 
misses was subtracted from the signal for reappraise hits to obtain 
the Dm estimate for each individual. The reappraisal Dm estimate 
in the amygdala for each individual was then correlated with their 
reappraisal Dm estimate in the hippocampus. This approach pro-
vides information regarding regions that covary as a function of 
memory success.
results
effect of eMotIon and Its regulatIon
Behavioral valence and regulation success ratings
We first examined the effect of emotion regulation on valence rat-
ings (Figure 2A). Repeated-measures ANOVA for condition type 
(reappraisal,  suppression,  view,  and  neutral)  revealed  a  highly 
significant effect of condition [F(3,72) = 104.16, P < 0.0001]. 
Post hoc tests confirmed that participants had lower valence rat-
ings during each of the negative picture conditions than the neu-
tral condition (P’s < 0.0001). As expected, participants reported 
higher valence ratings when instructed to reappraise a negative 
picture than when instructed to suppress or view a negative picture 
(P’s < 0.02). Furthermore, participants had higher valence ratings 
when instructed to suppress a negative picture than simply view a 
negative picture (P < 0.001). These results indicate that emotional 
distress for negative picture viewing was reduced when participants 
engaged in emotion regulation, with greater reduction during reap-
praisal than suppression.
Figure 2 | Behavioral results. (A) Valence ratings for each condition. Higher 
numbers on the scale indicate more positive valence ratings. Participants had 
the highest valence ratings for the neutral condition. Within negative picture 
viewing, participants had significantly higher valence ratings after reappraising 
pictures relative to suppressing or viewing. (B) Subsequent memory 
performance showed greatest retention for reappraised pictures than the 
other conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  5
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Table 1 | regions activated during negative picture viewing.
Brain region  Side  MNi  Z-score 
    coordinates
  x  y  z 
View > NeuTrAl
  Subcallosal cortex  L  −6  4  −14  4.14
  Midbrain  R  2  −26  −2  4.06
  L  −2  −26  −2  4.03
  Frontal pole  R  20  60  24  4.02
  Angular gyrus  R  64  −46  30  3.87
  Posterior cingulate cortex  R  4  −50  28  3.79
  L  −6  −44  20  3.3
  Amygdala  R  20  −6  −14  3.62
  L  −20  −4  −18  2.7
  Fusiform gyrus  L  −42  −58  −16  3.54
  Insular cortex  R  40  −6  −8  3.09
View > reApprAiSe
  Somatosensory cortex  L  −56  −16  32  4.89
  R  22  −48  72  4.23
  Insular cortex  R  44  −8  4  4.58
  L  −44  −6  −2  4
  Amygdala  L  −22  −8  −18  3.21
  R  18  −6  −16  2.96
View > SuppreSS
  Amygdala  R  22  −6  −12  3.06
  L  −20  −6  −18  2.84
MNI coordinates represent local maxima within clusters determined by Z > 2.3 
and a corrected cluster significance threshold of P = 0.05 with the exception of 
the amygdala (see Materials and Methods).
The comparison of reappraise > suppress revealed activity in sev-
eral prefrontal cortex regions including the LIFG and frontal pole 
(Figure 3D; Table 2). By contrast, suppressing facial expressions (rela-
tive to passive viewing) engaged bilateral insular cortex, supramarginal 
gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus (Figure 3E; Table 2). The contrast 
of suppress > reappraise revealed activation in bilateral insula and 
supramarginal gyrus (Figure 3F; Table 2). There was no amygdala 
activity in the reappraise or suppress contrasts. These results dem-
onstrate greater activity in prefrontal cortex during reappraisal than 
suppression. Although both reappraisal and suppression were effective 
in reducing amygdala activity, reappraisal also reduced insular activ-
ity, which is associated with representation of internal bodily states 
including those related to negative affect (Craig, 2009).
effect of eMotIon regulatIon on MeMory systeMs
Memory performance
D prime (d′) was computed as a measure of memory perform-
ance for each condition (Figure 2B). Repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of emotion regulation on memory 
[F(3,72) = 3.09, P < 0.05]. As expected, memory performance was 
greater for the reappraise condition than the suppress (P < 0.009), 
view (P < 0.02), and neutral (P < 0.04) conditions. These results 
are consistent with previous behavioral findings of explicit mem-
ory enhancement for reappraisal relative to suppression (Dillon 
et al., 2007).
Emotion regulation effect on memory
The Dm effect was calculated for each condition and ROI (see 
Materials and Methods). Correlational analyses were then per-
formed across subjects to examine co-activation patterns between 
the hippocampus and other areas, including the amygdala and pre-
frontal cortical regions that index successful memory encoding. In 
support of previous studies of emotional memory (Dolcos et al., 
2004), a strong correlation between the amygdala Dm and hip-
pocampus Dm was observed for the view condition [r(22) = 0.75, 
P < 0.0001]. A strong correlation between the Dm of these regions 
was also observed for reappraise [r(23) = 0.89, P < 0.00001], but 
not for suppress [r(22) = 0.26, P > 0.2]. Fisher Z-tests confirmed 
that the amygdala–hippocampal Dm correlation values were sig-
nificantly higher for view than suppress (P < 0.03) and reappraise 
than suppress (P < 0.001), but not for reappraise and view (P = 0.16; 
Figure 4A).
We observed a significant Dm correlation between the hippoc-
ampus and LIFG for reappraisal [r(24) = 0.63, P < 0.001], but 
not for view [r(23) = 0.03, P > 0.91] or suppress [r(21) = 0.09, 
P > 0.69] (Figure 4B). Fisher Z-tests confirmed that the reappraise 
Dm correlation was significantly higher than view (P < 0.03) and 
suppress (P < 0.05).
To examine the possibility that additional prefrontal cortical 
regions may influence memory encoding during emotion regula-
tion, we computed Dm correlations between the hippocampus 
and four additional prefrontal ROIs that were activated in the 
main effect of memory: left posterior inferior frontal gyrus, left 
superior frontal gyrus, frontal pole, and left medial prefrontal 
cortex. As shown in Table 3, there were no significant Dm cor-
relations between the hippocampus and any of the additional 
prefrontal ROIs. These results suggest that LIFG may serve a 
specific role in the memory enhancement effect during cogni-
tive reappraisal.
dIscussIon
The present study examined the neural circuitry of memory forma-
tion while participants actively attempted to regulate their negative 
emotion. There were three main results. First, participants showed 
a reduction in negative affect and better memory performance after 
engaging in cognitive reappraisal than when instructed to sup-
press or passively view negative images. Second, the hippocampus, 
amygdala, and LIFG were highly and selectively correlated during 
cognitive reappraisal, whereas the hippocampus and amygdala were 
correlated during the passive view condition only. Finally, examina-
tion of the neural main effects of emotion regulation revealed that 
engaging in either cognitive reappraisal or expressive suppression 
resulted in the down-regulation of putative affective circuits rela-
tive to passive viewing, with cognitive reappraisal resulting in even 
greater activity reductions than expressive suppression.
The finding that cognitive reappraisal resulted in enhanced 
behavioral memory performance is consistent with the prior lit-
erature. We have previously noted that the memory advantage for 
cognitive reappraisal may be subserved by the levels-of-processing 
effect (Dillon et al., 2007), which is characterized by deeper cogni-
tive analysis of stimuli (Craik and Lockhart, 1972). Reappraisal 
involves modification of emotional experience, which requires the 
individual to identify negative thoughts that initially arise from Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  6
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By contrast, expressive suppression encourages shallow encod-
ing of the stimulus by re-directing attention from the stimulus 
to monitoring one’s external expression of emotion. Therefore a 
comparison of cognitive reappraisal and suppression constitutes 
a levels-of-processing manipulation in the affective domain. Our 
view is that during the act of reappraising, individuals elaborate 
upon the stimulus to the extent that encoding is facilitated and 
the formation of long-term representations is enhanced. It follows 
that reappraisal requires ongoing, effortful processing to reduce 
negative affect and boost memory performance once a negative 
stimulus is encountered. Interestingly, others have posited that 
the memorial benefits of cognitive reappraisal may be subserved 
by a reduction in cognitive resources (Richards and Gross, 2000). 
Specifically, this hypothesis suggests that the resources required to 
cognitively reappraise are expended very early in the regulation 
process, freeing availability of cognitive resources for encoding. 
These two hypotheses (elaborative encoding view and reduced 
resource view) highlight the differences in the temporal features 
of  cognitive  reappraisal.  Whereas  our  paradigm  examines  the 
processes involved after individuals are presented with a negative 
situation, Gross (1998) suggests that cognitive reappraisal is an 
stimulus viewing and actively change the meaning and intensity 
of the stimulus. Recruitment of the LIFG and hippocampus simul-
taneously during cognitive reappraisal may support the observed 
memory enhancement. Previous work has shown that the LIFG 
is responsive to an interaction between deep encoding and sub-
sequent memory (Wagner et al., 1998; Otten et al., 2001; Fletcher 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, the LIFG has been implicated in tasks in 
language tasks requiring decisions about word meaning, suggest-
ing that this region is involved in the analysis of meaning during 
episodic encoding (Gabrieli et al., 1998). Across several studies, 
the locus of LIFG activity in predicting encoding success varies 
from more dorsal activity along the inferior frontal gyrus to more 
ventral activity along the lateral orbitofrontal cortex, encompass-
ing Brodmann’s areas 6, 44, 45, and 47 (Buckner et al., 1999). We 
observed LIFG activity in a more ventral anterior region (Figure 4). 
This region overlaps almost exactly with that observed during a 
prior deep encoding task (Fletcher et al., 2003). By contrast, the 
LIFG was not correlated with the hippocampus during the sup-
pression or negative view conditions. Thus, it stands to reason that 
the LIFG may underlie meaning change and deep encoding during 
cognitive reappraisal.
Figure 3 | fMri results for each negative emotion regulation condition. 
Top row: Passively viewing negative pictures yielded more bilateral amygdala 
activity than either reappraise (A) or suppress (B), and greater bilateral insula 
activity than reappraise (A). Middle row: Frontal cortex increases during 
reappraisal included (C) greater bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and paracingulate 
gyrus activity than passive viewing, and (D) greater left inferior frontal gyrus and 
frontal polar responses than during suppression. Bottom row: Suppression 
engaged bilateral insula relative to both passive viewing and reappraisal, with 
additional supramarginal gyrus recruitment relative to passive viewing (e) and 
somatosensory cortex recruitment relative to reappraisal (F).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  7
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the suppress condition, uncoupling amygdala modulation of the 
hippocampus during this condition. We cannot fully test this idea 
in the present study given that we did not observe a detriment in 
expressive suppression memory performance relative to passive 
viewing as often observed in the behavioral literature; therefore, 
greater study of amygdala and hippocampal activity during regula-
tion strategies is clearly warranted.
Taken together, the data from the present study provide some 
intriguing answers to questions regarding memory enhancement 
during cognitive reappraisal. The memory benefit derived from 
reappraisal may reflect both amygdala and LIFG modulation of the 
hippocampus during encoding, reflecting elaboration of emotion-
ally laden content. Both of these functional interactions are absent 
during suppression, and the suppression condition yielded poorer 
memory relative to reappraisal. This cognitive cost may be due to 
greater internal monitoring of negative emotion and its display, 
in lieu of deep cognitive analysis of the stimuli. We observed the 
memory benefit for cognitively reappraised items after a 2-week 
delay, suggesting that the effect of cognitive reappraisal is evident for 
at least 2 weeks. However, a recent study suggests that there may not 
be a memory benefit for cognitive reappraisal after 1 year (Erk et al., 
2010). A natural future direction of this work will be to examine 
how long-lasting the positive effects are, and factors that strengthen 
or weaken the observed positive outcomes of reappraisal.
In addition to the novel findings discussed above, the present 
study replicated and extended the current knowledge of neural cir-
cuitry underlying cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. 
The act of reappraising one’s emotions likely invokes several cogni-
tive processes, including working memory, lexical analysis, selective 
attention, and response inhibition. Consistent with our findings, 
in which we observed activity in several PFC regions during reap-
praisal, reviews of the neuroimaging literature have shown that 
medial and lateral PFC regions are engaged during reappraisal that 
may constitute a cognitive control system for regulating emotion 
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2008). While it is yet unclear what the 
precise subcomponents of cognitive reappraisal are, our findings 
provide evidence for the LIFG’s involvement in cognitive processes 
leading to meaning change.
The present results provide evidence for an internal monitoring 
process as a putative neural mechanism for expressive suppression. 
The suppression condition was associated with greater activity in 
somatosensory and insular cortices. The insular cortex has been asso-
ciated with attention to internal bodily states (Critchley et al., 2004), 
body movement (Farrer et al., 2003), and subjective feelings of anger, 
disgust, and aversion, among others (Craig, 2009). The increased insu-
lar activity observed during suppression dovetails with the notion 
that suppression leads to heightened self-focus, as individuals direct 
their attention inward to monitor their expressions (Richards and 
Gross, 2000). The improvement in valence ratings and reduction in 
amygdala activity observed during suppression may suggest that the 
internal monitoring of one’s expressions was somewhat helpful in 
managing one’s negative affect. Another recent study also observed 
that individuals reported more positive valence ratings after sup-
pressing than when viewing negative pictures, despite greater activ-
ity in the insula and somatosensory cortices (Goldin et al., 2008). 
Engaging in suppression may still be beneficial toward managing 
one’s self-perceptions as well as outward appearance, which could 
antecedent strategy, occurring prior to a negative response (Gross, 
1998). Although it is likely that different cognitive processes may 
be involved as a function of timing (Kalisch, 2009), nevertheless, 
it appears that memory is enhanced during cognitive reappraisal 
whether individuals engage in reappraisal prior to encountering a 
negative stimulus or after the negative situation is presented.
Interestingly, the significant co-activation of right amygdala 
and hippocampus observed during reappraisal suggests that the 
amygdala may influence memory encoding even when its activity is 
diminished overall compared to passive viewing of negative pictures. 
Although speculative, it is possible that in order to change one’s 
cognitions, individuals must engage with the negative informa-
tion, leading to amygdala modulation of hippocampal-dependent 
memory processes. Whereas this negative engagement continues 
under the passive viewing condition, negative cognitions are altered 
under the reappraisal condition, thereby reducing negative affect. 
By contrast, individuals attempt to avoid negative emotions during 
Table 2 | regions activated during reappraisal and suppression.
Brain region  Side  MNi  Z-score 
    coordinates
   x  y  z 
reApprAiSe > View
  Inferior frontal gyrus  L  −50  28  −14  5.38
  R  48  30  −8  4.58
  Paracingulate gyrus  L  −6  22  44  5.27
  Middle frontal gyrus  L  −42  20  46  5.24
  Middle temporal gyrus  L  −58  −38  −2  4.92
  Superior frontal gyrus  L  −26  20  56  4.68
  Parietal cortex  L  −54  −58  44  4.4
reApprAiSe > SuppreSS
  Middle temporal gyrus  L  −60  −4  −26  4.95
  Superior frontal gyrus  L  −8  62  30  4.36
  Superior frontal gyrus  L  −26  20  56  3.46
  Superior frontal gyrus  R  10  66  12  3.5
  Inferior frontal gyrus  L  −34  22  −22  3.51
SuppreSS > View
  Parietal cortex  R  62  −48  26  4.91
  L  −48  −60  54  4.75
  Paracingulate gyrus  R  8  26  38  4.44
  Superior frontal gyrus  R  16  12  62  4.2
  Insular cortex  R  34  18  2  4.18
  L  −36  4  0  4.16
  Inferior frontal gyrus  L  −46  46  −8  3.73
  Inferior frontal gyrus  R  42  46  18  3.6
SuppreSS > reApprAiSe
  Supramarginal gyrus  L  −66  −30  28  4.36
  R  64  −22  26  3.82
  Insular cortex  R  44  2  6  4.06
  L  −42  −8  −6  3.8
  Somatosensory cortex  R  62  −18  28  3.2
  L  −56  −20  28  3.19
MNI coordinates represent local maxima within clusters determined by Z > 2.3 
and a corrected cluster significance threshold of P = 0.05.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  8
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ter doing. We found that although individuals had improved valence 
ratings for both reappraisal and suppression, they had even higher 
valence ratings for reappraisal, suggesting that there is a true benefit 
for reappraisal. Additionally, we included a confidence measure in our 
design, asking individuals to rate how well they were able to engage 
in the given strategy (Figure 1). Analysis of these ratings suggested 
that individuals rated improved valence when they were successful in 
reappraising, but not suppressing or viewing the picture.
explain why some individuals continue to utilize suppression despite 
its relative inferior performance in reducing negative affect. While 
interpreting the valence results, it could be argued that the improve-
ment in valence ratings during emotion regulation reflects individuals 
responding how they think they should feel in the study rather than 
how they actually felt. However, this possibility is made less likely by 
the fact that participants had to engage in two different strategies, 
and would not know which strategy they were supposed to feel bet-
Figure 4 | Subsequent memory due to memory (Dm) correlations 
between prefrontal and medial temporal lobe regions-of-interest (rOi) as a 
function of regulation strategy. (A) Stronger right amygdala–hippocampal 
correlation for the reappraise and view conditions than for suppress. 
(B) Stronger LIFG–right hippocampal correlation for the reappraise condition 
than for view and suppress. (C) Percent signal changes for each condition and 
ROI, collapsed across memory. R = right hemisphere, Dm = difference due to 
memory, LIFG = left inferior frontal gyrus.
Table 3 | prefrontal correlations with right hippocampus.
Brain region  MNi coordinate x, y, z  Side  reappraise  View  Suppress
Ant, LIFG  −46,30,−10  L  0.63**  0.03  0.09
Post, LIFG  −52,18,4  L  0.36  0.21  0.26
SFG  −10,40,46  L  0.28  −0.02  0.32
Frontal pole  12,64,14  R  0.23  0.3  0.07
Medial cortex  −2,36,−18  L  0.16  0.36  0.25
MNI coordinates report peak voxel of functional ROIs. Values are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. **P < 0.01.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 230  |  9
Hayes et al.  Emotion regulation and memory
Center for the Study of Emotion and 
Attention.
McGaugh, J. L. (2004). The amygdala 
modulates the consolidation of mem-
ories of emotionally arousing experi-
ences. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27, 1–28.
Ochsner, K., and Gross, J. (2008). Cognitive 
emotion regulation. Curr. Dir. Psychol. 
Sci. 17, 153.
Ochsner, K. N. (2004). For better or for 
worse: neural systems supporting the 
cognitive down- and up-regulation of 
emotion. Neuroimage 23, 483–499.
Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross, J. J., 
and Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002). Rethinking 
feelings: an fMRI study of the cogni-
tive regulation of emotion. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 14, 1215–1229.
Ochsner, K. N., and Gross, J. J. (2005). The 
cognitive control of emotion. Trends 
Cogn. Sci. 9, 242–249.
Otten, L. J., Henson, R. N. A., and Rugg, 
M. D. (2001). Depth of processing 
effects on neural correlates of mem-
ory encoding – relationship between 
findings from across and within-task 
comparisons. Brain 124, 399–412.
Paller, K. A., and Wagner, A. D. (2002). 
Observing the transformation of 
experience into memory. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. 6, 93–102.
Richards, J. M., Butler, E. A., and Gross, 
J. J. (2003). Emotion regulation in 
romantic relationships: the cognitive 
consequences of concealing feelings. 
J. Soc. Pers. Relat. 20, 599–620.
Richards, J. M., and Gross, J. J. (1999). 
Composure at any cost? The cognitive 
consequences of emotion   suppression. 
Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 25, 1033–1044.
suppression of negative emotion. Biol. 
Psychiatry 63, 577–586.
Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and 
response-focused emotion regulation: 
divergent consequences for experience, 
expression, and physiology. J. Pers. Soc. 
Psychol. 74, 224–237.
Guo, H., and Song, A. W. (2003). Spiral-
in-and-out functional image acquisi-
tion with embedded z-shimming for 
susceptibility signal recovery. J. Magn. 
Reson. Imaging 18, 389–395.
Hamilton, J., and Gotlib, I. (2008). Neural 
substrates of increased memory sensitiv-
ity for negative stimuli in major depres-
sion. Biol. Psychiatry 63, 1155–1162.
Hill, R., and Barton, R. (2005). Red 
enhances human performance in 
contests. Nature 435, 293.
Jenkinson, M., Bannister, P., Brady, M., 
and Smith, S. (2002). Improved opti-
mization for the robust and accurate 
linear registration and motion cor-
rection of brain images. Neuroimage 
17, 825–841.
Kalisch, R. (2009). The functional neu-
roanatomy  of  reappraisal:  time 
matters. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33, 
1215–1226.
Kaya, N., and Epps, H. (2004). Relationship 
between color and emotion: a study 
of college students. Coll. Stud. J. 38, 
396–406.
LaBar, K. S., and Cabeza, R. (2006). 
Cognitive neuroscience of emo-
tional memory. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 
7, 54–64.
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., and Cuthbert, 
B. N. (1997). International Affective 
Picture System. Gainesville: NIMH 
by event-related functional MRI. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 96, 7514.
Dillon, D. G., Ritchey, M., Johnson, B. D., 
and LaBar, K. S. (2007). Dissociable 
effects of conscious emotion regula-
tion strategies on explicit and implicit 
memory. Emotion 7, 354–365.
Dolcos, F., LaBar, K. S., and Cabeza, 
R. (2004). Interaction between the 
amygdala and the medial temporal 
lobe memory system predicts better 
memory for emotional events. Neuron 
42, 855–863.
Elliot, A., and Maier, M. (2007). Color and 
psychological functioning. Curr. Dir. 
Psychol. Sci. 16, 250.
Erk, S., von Kalckreuth, A., and Walter, 
H. (2010). Neural long-term effects 
of emotion regulation on episodic 
memory processes. Neuropsychologia 
48, 989–996.
Farrer, C., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Frith, 
C. D., Decety, J., and Jeannerod, M. 
(2003). Modulating the experience of 
agency: a positron emission tomogra-
phy study. Neuroimage 18, 324–333.
Fletcher, P. C., Stephenson, C. M. E., 
Carpenter, T. A., Donovan, T., and 
Bullmore, E. T. (2003). Regional brain 
activations predicting subsequent 
memory success: an event-related 
FMRI study of the influence of encod-
ing tasks. Cortex 39, 1009–1026.
Gabrieli, J., Poldrack, R., and Desmond, 
J. (1998). The role of left prefrontal 
cortex in language and memory. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 95, 906.
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., and 
Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of 
emotion regulation: reappraisal and 
references
Beckmann, C. F., Jenkinson, M., and 
Smith, S. M. (2003). General multilevel 
linear modeling for group analysis in 
FMRI. Neuroimage 20, 1052–1063.
Bonanno, G. A., Papa, A., Lalande, K., 
Westphal, M., and Coifman, K. (2004). 
The importance of being flexible – The 
ability to both enhance and suppress 
emotional expression predicts long-
term adjustment. Psychol. Sci. 15, 
482–487.
Brewin, C. R. (2001). Memory processes 
in post-traumatic stress disorder. Int. 
Rev. Psychiatry 13, 159–163.
Buckner, R. L., Kelley, W. M., and Petersen, 
S. E. (1999). Frontal cortex contributes 
to human memory formation. Nat. 
Neurosci. 2, 311–314.
Cahill, L., and McGaugh, J. L. (1998). 
Mechanisms of emotional arousal and 
lasting declarative memory. Trends 
Neurosci. 21, 294–299.
Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel 
now? The anterior insula and human 
awareness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 
59–70.
Craik, F. I. M., and Lockhart, R. S. (1972). 
Levels of processing – framework for 
memory research. J. Verbal Learn. 
Verbal Behav. 11, 671–684.
Critchley, H. D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., 
Ohman, A., and Dolan, R. J. (2004). 
Neural systems supporting intero-
ceptive awareness. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 
189–195.
D’Esposito, M., Postle, B., Jonides, J., and 
Smith, E. (1999). The neural substrate 
and temporal dynamics of interference 
effects in working memory as revealed 
are also consistent with prior behavioral evidence that the process 
of  thought  change  boosts  long-term  memory  while  simultane-
ously reducing negative affect. In contrast to reappraisal, expressive 
suppression yielded poorer memory performance, milder valence 
benefits, no LIFG–MTL coupling, and greater activity in somatic 
monitoring regions. These results advance neurobiological models 
of emotional memory and show how task-dependent functional con-
nectivity analyses complement univariate statistical approaches to 
understand complex emotion–memory interactions. Because cog-
nitive reappraisal is a cornerstone of cognitive–behavioral therapy, 
these findings have important clinical ramifications for understand-
ing how to help individuals “stay cool when things get hot.”
acknowledgMents
We would like to extend thanks to Jessica Nasser and Elizabeth 
Selgrade  for  their  help  with  data  collection  and  analysis,  and 
Dan Dillon, Florin Dolcos, and Scott Hayes for helpful discus-
sions  regarding  the  project.  This  work  was  supported  by  the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Mental Illness Research Education 
and Clinical Center Grant for Post-Deployment Mental Health, and 
US National Institutes of Health (grant numbers K23 MH073091, 
K23 MH084013, and 2 P01 NS041328.
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activity relates to downstream cognitive consequences of engaging 
in these regulatory strategies.
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